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Globally, excess salt intake is a significant cause of preventable heart disease and stroke,
given the established links between high salt intake, high blood pressure, and cardiovas-
cular disease. This paper describes and evaluates the voluntary approaches to salt
reduction that operate in the United Kingdom and the United States, and proposes a new
strategy for improving their performance. Drawing on developments in the theory and
practice of public health governance, as well as theoretical ideas from the field of regula-
tory studies, this paper proposes a responsive regulatory model for managing food refor-
mulation initiatives, including salt reduction programs. This model provides a transparent
framework for guiding industry behavior, making full use of industry’s willingness to
participate in efforts to create healthier products, but using ‘legislative scaffolding’ to
escalate from self-regulation towards co-regulation if industry fails to play its part in
achieving national goals and targets.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/).Introduction
Over the course of three electoral terms as Mayor of New York
City (2002e2013), Michael Bloomberg cemented a reputation
as an innovative and visionary public health leader. Although
well-known for his ultimately unsuccessful attempt to ban
the sale of large-sized soft drinks,1 Bloomberg’s0.1016/j.puhe.2015.01.007
ublished article. For cita
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).administration introduced a broad array of diet-related ini-
tiatives, including the National Salt Reduction Initiative
(NSRI), a public-private partnership that aims to reduce pop-
ulation salt intake through product reformulation.2
The NSRI illustrates an important trend in modern public
health governance: a public-private partnership that relies on
voluntary industry action. Although scholars express skepti-
cism about the value of partnerships with industry,3.
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ulatory approaches to reducing the behavioral risk factors for
non-communicable diseases (NCDs). These barriers include
food industry lobbying4 and consumer resistance to state
interference with the freedom to consume unhealthy prod-
ucts. Governments in western countries have also absorbed
elements of the neo-liberal agenda, including an unshakeable
faith in the primacy of markets, a commitment to minimizing
regulatory burdens on business, and sensitivity about the
prospect of a ‘nanny state’. Underlying these concerns is a
philosophical commitment to shifting social responsibilities
‘from the public sphere (where they formed part of the busi-
ness of government) to the private sphere …’.5 For all these
reasons, voluntary initiatives have increasingly become the
preferred strategy for addressing dietary risks at the popula-
tion level.
Globally, dietary risk factors and physical inactivity ac-
count for around 10% of the burden of disease.6 The World
Health Assembly has approved a set of nine voluntary targets
for reducing behavioral and physiological risk factors for
NCDs, including a target of reducing mean population salt
intake by 30% by 2025.7
This paper evaluates the voluntary approaches to salt
reduction that operate in the United Kingdom and the United
States, and proposes a new strategy for improving their per-
formance. Drawing on developments in the practice and
theory of public health governance, as well as theoretical
ideas from the field of regulatory studies, a responsive regu-
latory model was developed for managing food reformulation
initiatives, including salt reduction programs. This model
provides a transparent framework for guiding industry
behavior, making full use of industry’s willingness to partici-
pate in efforts to create healthier products, but using ‘legis-
lative scaffolding’8 to escalate from self-regulation towards
co-regulation if industry fails to play its part.The problem of salt consumption in the US and
UK
Heart disease and stroke are the first and fourth leading cau-
ses of death in the United States,9 and cardiovascular disease
remains the most common cause of mortality in the United
Kingdom, accounting for 29% of all deaths.10 Hypertension is a
key risk factor for cardiovascular disease, and affects
approximately one-third of all adults in the US and UK.10,11
Reliable evidence establishes that reductions in salt intake
lower the blood pressure of people with both normal and
elevated levels, making salt reduction an important strategy
for preventing cardiovascular disease.12,13 Nearly 90% of the
American population exceeds the recommended daily sodium
intake (2400 mg/day),14,15 with a mean intake in excess of
3400 mg/day.16 Seventy per cent of the adult UK population
exceeds the recommended daily maximum of 6 g salt per
day,17 with a mean intake of 8.1 g/day.18
Conflicting findings on the relationship between salt and
cardiovascular risk raise questions about the benefits of so-
dium reduction.19,20 Some studies find that both low and high
levels of consumption are associated with increased risk of
cardiovascular events and mortality.21 An expert panelconvened by the Institute of Medicine supported efforts to
reduce population salt intake, but found insufficient evidence
to establish whether low sodium intake (below 2300 mg/day)
either increased or decreased cardiovascular risk in the gen-
eral population.22 The lack of consensus on salt consumption
has received widespread media attention23,24 and created
debate over the rigor of some studies.25 Yet the vast majority
of evidence confirms the need for relatively small but wide-
spread reductions in salt consumption among populations
with a high intake, including those in the US and UK.12,13,26,27
In developed countries, around 75e80% of sodium intake
comes from restaurant or processed food,28,29 and the hidden
salt content of these products makes it difficult for individuals
to reduce salt intake to healthy levels. Excess salt in food also
contributes to taste preferences for salty foods,30 further
undermining individual efforts to reduce salt intake. Accord-
ingly, substantial progress requires reductions in the amount
of salt used in the production of processed foods and prepre-
pared meals.31 Significant variations in the salt content of
similar products suggest that step-wise reformulation is
technically feasible,32,33 and reducing population salt intake is
a more cost-effective means of preventing cardiovascular
disease than medication to lower blood pressure.34 Accord-
ingly, the World Health Organisation identifies salt reduction
as one of several ‘best buy’ interventions for chronic disease
prevention.35
In developed countries, salt reduction programs often use a
three-pronged strategy: setting targets for voluntary food
reformulation across priority food categories; introducing
improved nutrition labeling; and public education campaigns
to warn consumers about the risks of excess salt intake.36 Two
prominent examples of such programs are the US NSRI, and
the UK Food Standards Authority’s (FSA) salt reduction
strategy.The US national salt reduction initiative
In 2008, the New York City (NYC) Department of Health initi-
ated a national partnership of city and state health de-
partments and public health organisations, with the goal of
reducing population salt intake by 20% over five years.30 In
2010, the NSRI released salt reduction targets for 62 categories
of packaged food and 25 categories of restaurant foods, with
interim and final targets set for 2012 and 2014 respectively.37,38
Companies meet their commitment under the NSRI provided
that the overall, sales-weighted mean sodium level of prod-
ucts within a particular category meets the relevant target,
even if some products do not.39 Restaurants must also meet a
target for the maximum sodium level that applies to all food
items, in addition to food category targets.30,37
To measure progress, the NYC Health Department devel-
oped a Packaged Food Database that merges sales and nutri-
tion data for 62 packaged food categories. A separate
Restaurant Food Database combinesmarket share data for the
top 50 restaurant chains (by sales) with nutrition data to
create 25 restaurant food categories.30,40 The NYS Health
Department measures sodium intake in the city’s population
using 24-h sodium urinary analysis, with data from a 2010
p u b l i c h e a l t h 1 2 9 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 0 6 1e1 0 7 3 1063survey providing a baseline againstwhich tomeasure changes
in sodium intake for the duration of the NSRI.30,41Evaluation of the NSRI
The NSRI contains some of the components needed for a
successful salt reduction strategy: an overall population target
for salt intake, a set of category-specific targets, and a
comprehensive monitoring mechanism. Twenty-eight lead-
ing food companies participate in the NSRI, representing
various sectors of the food industry.39 However, a number of
large, transnational manufacturers continue to ignore the
program, as do many prominent fast-food chains.42 The
voluntary nature of the program means that companies
cannot be forced to join: this undermines the creation of a
level playing field by allowing non-participants to ‘free-ride’
on the efforts of companies that join the scheme and reduce
salt levels in their products voluntarily.
The NSRI will request a written explanation from com-
panies that fail tomeet their commitments, and a revised plan
for meeting any missed reformulation targets.39 However,
there is no evidence that it ‘names and shames’ non-
performers through negative publicity, and more punitive
options are not available. The absence of meaningful sanc-
tions creates the risk of another form of free riding e where
participating companies receive the benefits of joining the
programwithout the costs of undertaking substantial product
reformulation.
Companies post their 2012 commitments on the NSRI’s
website, together with their progress in meeting those targets
and their commitments for 2014. In 2013, the NSRI announced
that 21 companies had met the 2012 salt reduction targets.43
However, companies’ progress reports are not systematic or
comprehensive, and there is no independent monitoring of
company results by external stakeholders. Overall, the design
of the NSRI makes it unlikely that this program will achieve
substantial reductions in population salt intake within the
agreed timeframe e a conclusion that is supported by
research showing no significant decline in the salt content of
processed and restaurant foods between 2005 and 2011.44 One
study reported that the sodium content of menu items from
eight leading fast-food chains rose by 23.4% between 1997 and
2010: none of these chains decreased sodium in their lunch or
dinner menu options.45 These restaurants accounted for
49.8% of the total sales of the top 50 fast-food restaurants in
2009, but none participated in the NSRI.45
In 2010, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) concluded that
voluntary efforts to reduce sodium intake over the past 40
years had failed to produce widespread improvements across
the food industry.30 The IOM recommended that the US Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) re-visit the classification of
salt as ‘generally recognized as safe’ (GRAS) under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act,46 and use its regulatory powers to
specify the conditions under which the use of salt in food is
considered safe (Appendix 1).30 Under the IOM’s approach, the
FDA would set salt GRAS standards for different categories of
food, to be implemented over time,30 and the salt in products
whose salt levels exceeded those contained in the standards
would become subject to regulation as a food additive.The FDA has been investigating options for improving salt
reduction initiatives for several years, based on the IOM’s
reccomendations.40,47 However, the agency faces significant
industry resistance,48 as even a voluntary program could be
interpreted by food companies as a ‘stern warning’ that could
be strengthened in future by mandatory standards.49,50The UK Food Standards Authority’s salt
reduction program and the Public Health
Responsibility Deal
In 2003, the FSA set the goal of reducing population salt intake
from 9.5 g to 6 g/day by 2010. Thereafter it consulted with the
food industry to develop salt reduction targets for 85 foods
across 30 product categories. Product reformulation was
supported by a consumer awareness campaign and voluntary
‘traffic-light’ labeling that uses red, amber and green symbols
to indicate high, medium and low levels of fat, sugar and salt,
respectively.18 The FSA carried out periodic 24-h urine surveys
to provide data on salt intake, established a databank tracking
levels of salt in key food products, and evaluated changes in
consumer behavior.51
Despite significant progress between 2001 and 2011 in
reducing salt intake in men (from 11 g/day to 9.3 g/day) and in
women (from 8.1 g/day to 6.8 g/day), the FSA’s reformulation
targets were not sufficient to achieve the overall target of 6 g
per day, and in 2009 the FSA published a revised set of targets
to be met by 2012.52 However, in 2010 the newly elected coa-
lition government transferred nutrition policy from the FSA to
the Department of Health, and the program then became part
of the Public Health Responsibility Deal, a public-private
partnership established in 2011.52
The Public Health Responsibility Deal aims to create a
health-promoting environment using voluntary agreements
with industry.53 Participants join the Deal by signing up to a
set of generally-expressed core commitments and supporting
pledges, as well as collective pledges that outline specific ac-
tions in the areas of food, alcohol, workplace health and
physical activity.54 Four networks are responsible for devel-
oping pledges and implementing commitments in each of
these areas, while a fifth network (behavior change), provides
expert advice across the Deal as a whole. The Deal is overseen
by a plenary group made up of senior representatives from
industry, NGOs, public health organisations and local gov-
ernment.54 Participating companies commit to writing de-
livery plans that describe their individual commitments,
monitoring progress against agreed indicators, and reporting
annually on their achievements.55
The Deal’s Salt Reduction Pledge commits signatories to
meet the FSA’s 2012 salt reduction targets, covering 80 prod-
uct categories and expressed as either sales-weighted aver-
ages for a particular product or for a particular range of
products, or as maximum salt levels for all new products
within each particular category.56 In July 2012 the Deal
launched three new pledges for the catering sector,57,58,59 and
a new pledge for meals purchased out of home followed in
March 2014.60 The network has also revised existing 2012
targets and set more demanding targets for 76 categories of
products, to be met by 2017.61 Table 1 illustrates the Deal’s
Table 1 e The Public Health Responsibility Deal’s 2012 and 2017 salt reduction targets.
Product category Sub-category 2012 target average
(mg sodium per 100 g)
2012 target
maximum
2017 target average 2017 target maximum
Bread Bread and bread rolls 400 mg N/A 360 mg 450 mg
Breakfast cereals N/A 244 mg 450 mg 235 mg 400 mg
Cheese Cheddar/hard-pressed cheese 720 mg N/A 700 mg 800 mg
Soups N/A 230 mg 290 mg 210 mg 250 mg
Table sauces Tomato ketchup N/A 730 mg N/A 680 mg
p u b l i c h e a l t h 1 2 9 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 0 6 1e1 0 7 310642012 and 2017 salt reduction targets, while Table 2 summa-
rizes the ‘Out of Home’ salt pledge, using examples from four
product categories.
Between 2004 and 2011, the UK program reduced salt levels
in key food products including breakfast cereals (from amean
salt content of 0.95 g/100 g to 0.41 g/100 g), soups (from 0.77 g/
100 g to 0.54 g/100 g), sweet biscuits (0.77 g/100 g to 0.58 g/
100 g), and processed cheese (2.84 g/100 g to 2.17 g/100).18
Consumer education campaigns resulted in a greater num-
ber of people using interpretive food labels when purchasing
products,52 and a steady decline in the amount of discre-
tionary salt added at the table.62 As a result, population salt
intake decreased 15% between 2001 and 2011, whichmay have
contributed to significant falls in blood pressure and cardio-
vascularmortality during the same period.18 However, despite
11 years of effort, average salt intake in the UK remains at
8.1 g/day e far higher than the FSA’s target of 6 g/day.Evaluation of the Responsibility Deal
The Responsibility Deal reflects a number of the limitations of
industry-controlled regulatory processes. Industry represen-
tatives comprise the largest proportion of the Deal’s governing
bodies, and critics argue that industry’s disproportionate level
of influence skews pledges towards its own economic in-
terests. Many pledges lack specificity and time frames for
action, which when combined with inadequate monitoring
and review mechanisms, undermines the accountability of
participants, and the ability to determine whether the Deal is
actually working.55,63 The 2012 salt reduction pledge has 78
participants, but a number of large companies have not
joined, and the newer salt reduction pledges have a much
smaller number of participants.56 Smaller, independent food
service establishments have proved reluctant to join the salt
reduction program; so too have caterers.64
The Deal has no enforcement options, and while the gov-
ernment has threatened the food industry with legislation, it
has not committed to specific, time-bound action if the Deal
fails to achieve its objectives - removing a powerful incentive
for industry to take voluntary reformulation seriously.63Table 2 e The Responsibility Deal’s out of home maximum pe
Category Sub-category
Burgers in bun Small burgers without cheese or other cured meats
Sandwich Cured meat sandwich
Pizza Take away style pizza with cured meat toppings (per
Potato products Seasoned friesPublic health researchers argue that the absence of compli-
ance mechanisms leaves multinational food companies free
to weaken the content of the pledges, without any concern for
negative consequences.63The rationale for strengthening salt reduction
programs and barriers to action
Public health experts have pointed to the advantages that
legislated targets for salt reductions would have over current,
voluntary processes.18,63 For example, one Australian study
suggests that mandatory salt limits for processed food could
avert 18% of Australia’s burden of cardiovascular disease - 20
times more than the health gains achieved by a similar
voluntary reformulation program.31 Public health advocates
also argue that the food industry is not a reliable partner in
voluntary reformulation efforts, pointing to a similar ‘play-
book’ of tactics to the tobacco industry: stymieing government
regulation, obfuscating scientific evidence, denying the health
harms of their products and targeting young people in mar-
keting for unhealthy foods and beverages.3,4
Despite this, there aremany political and cultural obstacles
to greater statutory control over levels of salt in food. Western
liberal societies attach considerable value to personal auton-
omy and to ‘self-governance’,65 meaning that the risk factors
arising from an unhealthy lifestyle are presumptively seen as
private matters. Unlike tobacco, which has no health benefits,
kills 50% of regular users,6,66 and causes the death of non-
smokers in a ratio of 10:1,6 salt is an important part of a
healthy diet. The public health goal is not to eliminate con-
sumption but to reduce prolonged over-consumption.67
Consolidation and concentration of the food industry has
resulted in a handful of large, transnational companies
dominating the global food supply.68 These companies exert
huge influence over the global production, sale and pricing of
food, as well as over the development of national food law and
policy.3,4
In contrast with tobacco, national governments invite the
food industry to participate in public health policymaking. For
example, the food industry participates in a plenary groupr serving salt targets.
Maximum per serving target (mg sodium per 100 g)
960 mg
1500 mg
slice) 500 mg
350 mg
p u b l i c h e a l t h 1 2 9 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 0 6 1e1 0 7 3 1065that oversees the Responsibility Deal,69 and is represented in
the network that devises collective pledges on product refor-
mulation, product labeling and consumer education.70 In
other cases, governments actively encourage self-regulation,
for example through voluntary standards on food adver-
tising to children, which are found in many countries
including the US.71 By populating the ‘regulatory space’ with
its own standards and institutions, the food industry makes it
easier for governments to rely on industry self-regulation,
rather than introduce new, mandatory schemes.72The changing nature of government regulation
Despite the political barriers to action, the state is and should
remain accountable for the public’s health and for the miti-
gation of health risks.65,73 Democratic processes enable the
public to hold the state accountable for its actions, and pro-
vide legitimacy for the public health laws and policies intro-
duced by governments.74 In contexts where private regulation
is the predominant form of control, governments neverthe-
less have a responsibility to ensure that the public’s interest is
safeguarded and that self-regulatory arrangements respond
to health risks in a credible and effective manner.
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has argued that gov-
ernment is the ‘steward’ of public health, establishing ‘the
rules under which the different agents operate in a way that is
compatible with promoting population health and reducing
inequalities’.65,75 The Nuffield Council incorporates a ‘ladder’
of interventions into its concept of stewardship, enabling
governments to choose from a hierarchy of interventions that
range from monitoring, providing information and enabling
healthier choices, to guiding choice through disincentives,
restricting choice, and eliminating choice through mandatory
standards.65 The Nuffield Council’s concept of stewardship
implies a flexible role for the state: one where it retains
leadership and accountability for public health, even when
not directly intervening.
The regulatory studies literature provides a broader
context for understanding the Nuffield Council’s stewardship
model and the changing nature of state regulation in the
contemporary era of ‘regulatory capitalism’. Regulatory capi-
talism is marked by growing corporatization and privatization
of public services, but accompanied by heightened demand
for regulation and a proliferation of new regulatory in-
struments.76,77 An important feature of this era is a move
away from a command-and-control model of regulation to-
wards more elastic forms of intervention that engage a range
of corporate, civil society and government actors.78 However,
the state remains centrally involved in regulatory processes,
for example by monitoring the performance of industry based
schemes and threatening legislative intervention if such
schemes prove ineffective.78e80 Conditions of regulatory cap-
italism have created a spectrum of regulatory options,
involving various levels of government intervention and legal
control,78,81 and a new ‘meta-regulatory’ role for the state e
shaping or steering the direction of industry action, rather
than trying to directly control corporate activities.82
Regulatory studies scholars have advanced normative
theories of when governments should intervene in themarket, as well as offering suggestions for effective regulatory
design. According to this literature, effective regulation in-
volves strong government leadership through the provision of
regulatory objectives and definitions of key terms.83 Clearly
defined substantive provisions should be combined with
comprehensive monitoring, a range of enforcement options,
and independent evaluation and audit.84,85 External stake-
holders should be included at all points of the regulatory
process, including through consultation on the content of
regulatory rules, and representation on administrative
bodies.86,87 This last point is worth stressing in light of con-
cerns about the ‘nanny state’: enhanced public participation
could be one way for health agencies to foster public owner-
ship of initiatives and to rebut claims of paternalism.88A responsive regulatory approach to population
salt reduction
‘Responsive regulation’ is an influential theory within regu-
latory studies that bridges the ideological divide between
those who favor self-regulation, and those who look to gov-
ernment to impose mandatory standards on industry.84,89e91
As developed by Ayres and Braithwaite, the theory of
responsive regulation argues that governments should tailor
their regulatory approach to the industry concerned, intro-
ducing more coercive controls according to industry’s level of
cooperation with softer measures.91 A responsive regulatory
approach provides an opportunity for businesses to demon-
strate voluntary leadership in public health, while the threat
of regulation provides the impetus for industry to develop
meaningful standards and to commit to them in order to avoid
even more interventionist, prescriptive measures.91,92 A
responsive approach also provides governments with addi-
tional options for accelerating progress in salt reduction while
reducing the political risks of legislative action, including the
delays and expense involved in developing comprehensive
statutory standards.84
The foundation stone for a successful framework for salt
reduction is an overall salt reduction target and a timeline for
achieving it. Since around three-quarters of dietary salt in
high-income western societies is added to food prior to pur-
chase,28,29 a case can be made for holding the food industry
accountable, collectively, for achieving three quarters of the
overall target, within a defined timeframe. The overall target
will necessarily drive the range of food categories that are
included in a salt reduction initiative, and the depth of targets
in each category that will be needed to achieve the overall goal
within the defined timeframe, via a series of interim,
category-specific targets.
In this context, industry self-regulation cannot mean the
absence of strategic goals, timelines, or accountability. A key
difference, however, is collective rather than individual
accountability, since government’s objective in permitting
private governance will be to minimize the imposition of
public standards on individual companies and products.
Successful self-regulation therefore rests on industry’s ca-
pacity to agree on a sufficiently ambitious set of targets for salt
reduction covering an acceptably broad range of the food
categories that contribute to excess dietary salt intake, so that
p u b l i c h e a l t h 1 2 9 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 0 6 1e1 0 7 31066it can achieve the share of the overall goal for population salt
reduction for which it can properly be held accountable.
Where voluntary and co-regulatory processes fail to reach
agreement on such a set of targets, or where a significant
number of major food companies fail to reformulate their
products in order to achieve them, government will have a
stronger case for seeking to accelerate progress through the
selective introduction of regulatory ‘scaffolds’.
Given the neo-liberal pre-occupation of some governments
with off-loading responsibilities from the public to the private
sphere, weak and ineffectual self-regulation is a serious riske
especially in public health. The authors advocate that gov-
ernments use ‘legislative scaffolds’ to strengthen under-
performing food reformulation schemes with progressively
more demanding requirements.72 In general, legislative scaf-
folds can strengthen voluntary schemes across three do-
mains. These are:
- regulatory content (e.g. specifying goals and targets, clari-
fying definitions, specific terms and conditions);
- regulatory processes (e.g. regulating the administration,
monitoring, and review of self-regulatory processes;
requiring independent audits); and
- enforcement (e.g. building in incentives for compliance
and penalties for non-compliance).
Drawing on these three domains, the following section
briefly describes how a responsive regulatory approach that
incorporates legislative scaffolds could be used to strengthen
both the US National Salt Reduction Initiative, and UK’s salt
reduction program (now located within the Responsibility
Deal).Strengthening the NSRI
The strategy for strengthening the NSRI proposed here con-
sists of three phases. It begins with voluntary reformulation
but progresses through co-regulation to statutory regulation
of salt reduction standards if industry fails to cooperate with
softer regulatory options. An incremental approach allows
time for consumers’ palates to adjust to the taste of less salty
foods, while the threat of mandatory standards creates a
strong incentive to make voluntary programs work.Phase 1
In phase 1, the NSRI would create a broader set of voluntary
reformulation targets, encompassing manufacturers, restau-
rants and retailers, grocery stores and supermarkets.
Maximum salt caps would apply to manufacturers and all
food retailers, as well as to chain restaurants. This would
prevent manufacturers from gaming the system by simply
creating low-salt variants to offset high-sodium options in
their product portfolio.37 For the same reason, accountability
for meeting targets across product categories should be
calculated on a sales-weighted basis. A less demanding - or
more permissive - requirement would be to apply salt caps
only to high-volume product categories that account for thelargest share of excess salt intake, or alternatively, to all new
products introduced into the market.
In Phase 1 the NSRI would invite large food manufacturers
and retailers to join the program, aswell as smaller companies
that produce commonly consumed high-salt products. This
invitation would be extended with the knowledge that the
program would become mandatory if too few companies
joined voluntarily. Alternatively, government could offer in-
centives, such as tax breaks, to companies that joined the
scheme or assisted smaller participants by sharing relevant
information and technology.
Food reformulation efforts under Phase 1 would be sup-
ported by strong, consistent messaging from public health
authorities about the dangers of a high-salt diet, with the aim
of shifting consumer preferences towards less salty products.
Public education is particularly important in light of conflict-
ing evidence about the health benefits of reducing salt intake,
and could encompass novel measures such as working with
supermarkets and other retailers to implement social mar-
keting campaigns.93 An interpretive front-of-pack labeling
scheme could also assist consumers to choose less salty foods
and provide an additional incentive for reformulation.52 The
FDA recently announced revisions to the Nutrition Facts
Panel,94 but has not pursued the IOM’s recommendation for a
simple, ‘nutritional tick’ system that would interpret the
nutritional quality of the food and help to identify healthier
choices.95 Accordingly, Phase 1 could involve the development
of a voluntary interpretive labeling system or promotional
symbol for products meeting reduction targets.
To enhance accountability, the NSRI could establish an
independent body comprising an equal balance of food in-
dustry representatives, relevant government agencies, public
health organisations, and consumer groups, vesting it with
responsibility for administering,monitoring and enforcing the
scheme. In phase 1, participants would be required to develop
and implement food reformulation plans and to report
annually on their progress to the administrative body. The
performance of the scheme would also be subject to regular,
independent review, both in terms of its progress in reaching
interim targets, and the compliance of participating com-
panies with their obligation to create action plans and report
on progress.
Phase 1 would rely primarily upon positive publicity and
incentives to encourage compliance. However, the NSRI’s
administrative body would have available a wider range of
enforcement options including negative publicity, fines, or
expulsion from the scheme in the event that a participant
repeatedly failed to meet reduction targets. The NSRI would
also put the food industry on notice that stronger (Phase 2)
actions would follow if participants failed to meet their com-
mitments to report regularly on progress, or if an inadequate
number of companies joined the program.
Phase 2
In Phase 2, participation in the NSRIwould becomemandatory
for all large food manufacturers, chain restaurants and large
food caterers, as well as for smaller businesses that produce
high-salt products. Warning labels would apply to all new
products exceeding maximum sodium levels for each food
s
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p u b l i c h e a l t h 1 2 9 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 0 6 1e1 0 7 3 1067category or sub-category. This measure would be highly un-
popular with the food industry, but was a key component of
Finland’s successful salt reduction strategy, and would
constitute one of the main features distinguishing Phases 1
and 2.96
Although the salt targets and maximum salt levels for all
food categories would remain voluntary in phase 2, the NSRI
administration would adopt a wider variety of enforcement
tools, including public reporting of industry compliance and
non-compliance, fines for late filing of annual reports, and
expulsion from the scheme for companies that failed to file
reports or makemeaningful progress. Expulsion would trigger
a requirement for individual companies to enter into a
corporate integrity agreement with the FDA, obliging them to
meet remedial, ‘catch-up’ targets that were appropriate for
their product portfolios, accompanied by reporting obligations
and significant fines for non-compliance. A precedent for this
form of regulatory action exists in the corporate integrity
agreements which the US Department of Health and Human
Services enters into with healthcare providers that are
investigated for breaching false claims statutes. Implemented
as part of civil settlements, corporate integrity agreements
require healthcare providers to take specific compliance steps
in exchange for not being excluded from federal government
health care programs.97
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If Phases 1 and 2 fail to achieve adequate progress towards salt
reduction targets, the FDA would introduce industry-wide,
prescriptive requirements, i.e., modifying the GRAS status
for salt, and setting standards for safe levels of salt in food, to
be gradually lowered over time. The FDA could also consider
mandatory warning labels for high-salt products, and/or the
introduction of a mandatory interpretive front-of-pack label-
ing system that highlights products high in salt, and other
over-consumed nutrients. Table 3 summarizes the staged
approach from voluntary, through co-regulatory, to manda-
tory regulation that might be used to strengthen the overall
performance of the NSRI.T
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Deal
The UK’s salt reduction program (as contained in the Re-
sponsibility Deal) is a much more comprehensive initiative
than the NSRI, with a larger number of participants, a broader
range of reformulation targets, and more sophisticated
monitoring and reporting mechanisms. Nevertheless, the
Deal faces at least three challenges: recruiting new partici-
pants to the salt pledges, ensuring that companies reformu-
late their product lines to meet the targets in the pledges, and
progressively raising targets for salt reductions over time
without losing participants. Below a staged approach was
suggested to strengthening the Deal, particularly its salt
reduction program.
p u b l i c h e a l t h 1 2 9 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 0 6 1e1 0 7 31068Phase 1
Critics have raised concerns about the lack of government
leadership and influence over the Deal.63 In the absence of
strong government leadership, the performance of the Deal is
likely to be severely limited by the inherent conflict of interest
between public health objectives and the economic self-
interest of participants.3,98,99 Accordingly, a first priority is
to increase the independence of the Deal’s administration by
winding back the dominance of industry on the Re-
sponsibility Deal Plenary Group,69 and on the Food Network’s
High-level Steering Group.100 In Phase 1, the UK Department
of Health could invite a wider range of relevant government
agencies (including the FSA), public health organisations and
consumer representatives to participate in these governing
structures, and ensure an equal representation of interests
between government, industry, public health and consumer
groups.
The Deal needs more members, both in order to create a
level playing field between participants and (current) non-
participants, and to extend the process of adjusting con-
sumers’ taste preferences downwards towards lower salt
products.101 In Phase 1 the government could undertake tar-
geted recruitment efforts: identifying non-participating food
manufacturers, retailers and caterers that contribute the
greatest amount of salt to the food supply, based on sales data,
and requesting them to join. These invitations would be
supported by advice to industry that participation would
become mandatory under Phase 2, should an insufficient
number of companies join the Deal.
New participants will find the Deal less attractive if it cre-
ates penalties for non-compliance, but this is preciselywhat is
required if it is to be amore successful initiative.18,102 The Deal
could take a staged approach to enforcement, relying upon
‘naming and shaming’ companies that fail to meet reformu-
lation targets in Phase 1, accompanied by praise for com-
panies that excel in product reformulation. In Phases 2 and 3,
the Deal would move towards more punitive, targeted forms
of enforcement, including fines and enforceable agreements.
At the present time, participants in the Deal self-report on
their compliance by filling in a form that describes the number
of product categories in which they aremeeting salt reduction
targets and the specific products within each category that
meet current targets. A more demanding monitoring mecha-
nism would include both process and outcome reporting,
requiring companies to actually outline the actions taken to
implement their commitments under the Deal. The Depart-
ment of Health could review companies’ reports, using the
data to evaluate improvements in each company’s products
from year to year, and to track participants’ progress overall.
Independent verification of companies’ reformulation prog-
ress would further improve the transparency and account-
ability of the deal,103 as would independent third-party review
of the extent to which participants internalize the Deal’s re-
quirements in corporate processes and decision-making.
One of the most important incentives for action will be the
potential for government intervention if the Deal fails to
improve the food supply. The UK government could give the
threat of legislative intervention more ‘bite’ by setting out aclear timeframe for legislation if progress continues to fall
behind minimum (stated) levels of achievement.63 For
example, the government could state that failure to achieve
80% of targets within three years will trigger the imposition
of mandatory product maximums for each category of food
product. This would give the threat of legislation greater
credibility, strengthen the government’s bargaining power
when negotiating with the food industry, and hopefully
galvanize a higher level of commitment from food
manufacturers.
Phase 2
As with the NSRI, legislative scaffolds could strengthen the
obligations of participants under the Responsibility Deal, in a
stepwise approach. In Phase 2 large food manufacturers and
retailers exceeding a minimum turnover would be required to
join the Deal (along with small companies selling high-salt
products), and maximum salt caps would be established for
a larger number of product categories. Although compliance
with these caps would remain voluntary, companies that
failed to reformulate their products would be required to carry
a high-salt warning label. Phase 2would also coincidewith the
mandatory introduction of interpretive traffic light labeling
for all food products, as well as a tax on selected categories of
high-salt snacks or other foods where the industry was not
making adequate progress, with the resulting revenue used to
fund consumer education and media campaigns.
Phase 2 would involve transferring administration of
the Deal to an independent regulator or government agency e
such as the FSA e to signal the government’s intention to
introduce a more demanding, co-regulatory approach. The
independent regulator would take charge of setting salt
reduction targets, in consultation with the Deal’s networks
and participating companies, and monitor participants’
response to salt reduction targets. Under Phase 2, the sales-
weighted, average salt reductions targets for each category
could remain voluntary, but the regulator could publicly
‘name and shame’ companies that made inadequate
progress.
Phase 3
If an independent review showed that phase 2 controls had
failed to ensure timely progress towards the overall salt
reduction target, a ‘two-track’ regulatory approach would be
triggered under Phase 3.104 Companies that were making
adequate progress would remain under the ambit of the Deal,
but the Department of Health would be granted authority to
require individual companies that repeatedly failed to meet
reformulation targets to enter into enforceable agreements
requiring individualized reformulation plans. These could
include company-specific targets and interim targets for
specified products or product lines, and specifications for how
these targets should be achieved.63 Non-compliant companies
could be subject to fines, and non-compliant products could
be prohibited from sale if companies repeatedly failed to meet
individualized performance targets and to report on their
compliance within the required timeframe.
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The selective use of these powerful tools would likely have a
‘game-changing’ effect on industry behavior, ensuring that
most companies invested sufficient resources in implement-
ing reformulation plans and monitoring progress in order to
remain in Phase 2. If, however, the food industry failed to
make adequate progress overall, the UK government could
consider introducing a more comprehensive regulatory
scheme in Phase 4, using performance-based regulation105,106
that imposed penalties on manufacturers that failed to meet
sales-weighted average targets, combined with mandatory
maximum salt caps across a significant range of processed
and restaurant food. The government could also consider
broadening responsibility for achieving national salt reduc-
tion targets to include supermarket chains, which could
contribute to targets imposed on this sector by stocking lower
salt products and pressuring manufacturers to reduce salt in
leading brands.106 Table 4 summarizes the staged approach to
strengthening the Responsibility Deal, focusing on the salt
reduction component of the Deal.
Conclusion
The concept of ‘legislative scaffolding’ draws attention to a
flexible array of options for government to strengthen the
performance of voluntary and co-regulatory programs and to
create more effective schemes for food reformulation. The
proposal presented here for progressively strengthening US
and UK salt reduction programs involves actions across three
dimensions: the regulatory standards or substantive re-
quirements of food reformulation schemes, their governance
processes, and enforcement mechanisms. Although the state
should take full advantage of market incentives for creating a
healthier food environment, the likely success of self-
regulation depends upon a genuine commitment by govern-
ment to achieve specific goals for reductions in population salt
intake within a defined timeframe. In turn, this requires
government to be willing to increase its level of supervision
and intervention when industry fails to make significant or
timely progress. Although food industry lobbying, and the
complexities of regulating the food supply, create practical
barriers to legislative action, governments are not reduced to a
stark choice between pure self-regulation and a comprehen-
sive set of statutory food reformulation targets. A responsive
approach, drawing on legislative scaffolding, suggests new
ways for the state to fulfill its responsibility as the steward of
public health in an era of regulatory capitalism.Author statements
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None declared.Appendix 1. : Reconsideration of the GRAS status
of salt under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act.
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, the classifica-
tion of a food ingredient as ‘generally recognized as safe’
(GRAS) excludes it from the definition of a ‘food additive’107
and from the premarket approval process that applies to
food additives e which requires the manufacturer to petition
the FDA and to provide evidence that demonstrates with
reasonable certainty that the additive is not harmful under
the conditions of intended use.108 In order to be classified as
GRAS, a food ingredient must satisfy the same test of
‘reasonable certainty of no harm’ that applies to food addi-
tives, except in the case of substances commonly added to
food prior to 1958e including saltewhere general recognition
of safety is demonstrated through ‘experience based on
common use in food’.108
Federal regulations authorize the FDA to either contest or
to affirm the pre-existing GRAS status of a food ingredient
through a public process that involves making a preliminary
determination, making the supporting evidence publicly
available and, considering public comments.109,110 Thereafter,
if the Commissioner concludes that there is a lack of
convincing evidence that the ingredient is GRAS, the
Commissioner shall issue a food additive regulation that
specifies appropriate uses and levels of use of the additive in
food.111
However, if the Commissioner concludes that the ingre-
dient is GRAS, the Commissioner may nevertheless add spe-
cific limitations, including the category of foods in which the
ingredient may be used, the functional uses of the ingredient,
and levels of use.112 Any use of the ingredient other than in
full compliance with these limitations requires the FDA to
issue a separate food additive regulation.r e f e r e n c e s
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